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The Energy Challenges in the near Future
During the recent gas dispute between Russia and
Ukraine it took the EU quite some time to under-
stand what was really happening. And soon after
Brussels recognized that this was not only a trade
issue a common EU approach was challenged by
several bilateral moves. Hence, the Union missed
another opportunity for ‘speaking with one voice’.
NATO on her part did not show any public reaction
at all. But this very crisis in particular showed that
not only the dependent import countries suffer from
such a dispute but also the producers that are very
often reliant on the revenue from energy trades. To
begin with, the framework of energy politics is
determined by three major trends that will affect our
energy systems fundamentally:
– Supply and demand: Due to a
rising demand especially in
Asia, the general physical
scarceness of fossil fuels,
and the lack of investment in new deposits, alter-
native sources of energy and energy technologies
during the times of  ‘cheap’ energy will bring
fiercer tensions about the access to remaining
fossil fuels, higher prices on tighter markets, and,
in the longer run, an increase in the use of renew-
able energies along with a more efficient use of
energy.
– Economic aspects: Although the Western indus-
trialized states cut their energy intensity, our
economies are still massively influenced by the
prices for oil and gas and the availability of
resources. The falling price of crude oil from over
100 US$ a barrel last year to the current price of
about 40 US$ per barrel saves the oil-importing
countries approximately 1 trillion US$. On the
other hand, this year’s gas dispute led to indus-
trial shutdowns in Central and Eastern Europe.
Bulgaria alone has had a loss of productivity
worth more than 50 billion Euros.
– Global politics: Energy has become a highly politi-
cized topic as result of international terrorism
and the re-emergence of piracy, but mainly due
to energy nationalism and the trend to use
resources as political tools. The revitalization of
OPEC and the establishment of a ‘big gas troika’
– currently consisting of the three biggest holders
of natural gas reserves Iran, Qatar, and Russia –
further strengthens the upstream-countries com-
pared to their customers. Neither OPEC nor, to
an even lesser extent, the gas cartel will be able
to dominate the markets as
OPEC did during the first oil
crisis, but there still exists the
potential for disruptions and
major tensions.
Multidimensionality of energy security
These trends in regard to future NATO-involvement
lead to the unavoidable question of militarization of
energy security. And even more so as energy experts
still quarrel whether or not there is too much or not
enough politics and security thinking about energy.
The truth is that energy security includes all these
aspects. Sure, it is a question of economics to trade
resources, build pipelines, and invest in plants and
infrastructures, but only as long as business is not
hampered by political interferences. When the
means of producing energy are subordinated to eco-
nomic and ecological targets or the access to energy
is misused by international power politics business
alone will not solve the problem.
“The EU missed another opportunity
for ‘speaking with one voice’. NATO
on her part did not show any public
reaction at all.”
Europe seems to be working hard on energy security, but in reality nothing much happens. Most European states
lack indigenous reserves and thus are dependent on foreign suppliers, but they still do not come to terms with
common countermeasures. Both NATO and EU still lack a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the security
aspects of energy, including the security of supplies as well as the political and economic challenges of import
dependency and energy shortages. Instead of absurd duplication NATO and EU could pool resources and find a
common answer to address their member states’ energy security problem, a BerlinPlus agreement for energy.
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As a multidimensional concept energy security con-
tains domestic affairs and economic aspects but also
geopolitics and a security dimension. Consequently
only a holistic approach that tackles all of theses
spheres will be successful. So the first problem of
multidimensionality is about the time horizon of
measures; about finding the right instrument at the
right time. A politically motivated energy cut-off as
it happened during the recent Russian-Ukrainian
power game in the short run will call for diplomatic
and security efforts to force both parties to surren-
der. For the medium term there is time for diversifi-
cation, the build-up of domestic emergency capac-
ity, and economic stimuli for
alternative fuels, energy effi-
ciency, and savings. In the long
run all actors concerned should
aim for stable and transparent
structures of governance.
The second problem, which basically refers to the
geopolitical dimension of energy security, lies in dif-
ferent interests and global insecurities that energy
relations have to face. First of all energy security
comprehends security of supply as well as security
of demand. So in general consumer countries have
different interests than producer or transit countries.
No matter if the relations between these countries
are equitable, interdependent, or asymmetrical in
favor of one side, every approach on energy security
has to respect antagonistic interests and thus calls
for coordinated action. That does not mean that oil-
importing countries have to swallow every bitter pill
offered by their suppliers, but excessive confronta-
tion will lead to ‘strangulation’, which serves no-
body’s interest. Over and above the increasing level
of insecurity inflicted by terrorism, piracy, or simple
failure due to mature infrastructures leads to the
common interest that all states that are part of the
supply chain have in tackling these threats and as-
suring the steady and sufficient transport of energy.
EU and NATO: Two different approaches to
energy security
The European Union’s energy policy has undergone
some decisive changes over the last two years.
Despite the former focus on environmental aspects
and even more so on a single market for energy,
energy politics or security of supply has become
equally important, at least on paper. The recently
published 2nd Strategic Energy Review sets out an
agenda for energy security to complete the strategic
triangle. It is based on five priority areas:
– Infrastructures and diversification of energy sup-
plies;
– External energy relations;
– Strategic stocks and crisis response mechanisms;
– Energy efficiency and
– Domestic indigenous energy resources.
The cardinal improvement of the report is its broader
perspective of the term energy security, including the
interests of producer countries and the hitherto
weakness of a single voice of the member states
according to their relations with these countries.
NATO’s involvement in energy
matters started with a military
perspective. Without a suffi-
cient supply of energy, troops
would be stuck in the middle
of conflicts, unable to move and an easy prey for
their enemies. But over the years the Alliance devel-
oped a political branch, and after the collapse of the
Soviet Union energy security was embraced in the
new strategic concept as one of the risks of wider
nature. It took another 15 years for risk assessment
and infrastructure security with regard to energy to
be named explicitly on such a high level for the first
time, at the Riga summit. Until today NATO still has
no concrete concept about how it may engage. Four
fields of action are under consideration for some
time: Monitoring and surveillance of choke points
and crucial infrastructures, training missions in pro-
ducer and transit countries, collective emergency
planning and crisis reaction, and last but not least
pro-active preventive diplomacy through the organi-
zation’s dense web of diplomatic relations.
Hence, the potential for a NATO contribution to
energy security is limited but still significant. It is
now up to the strategic heads in the North Atlantic
Council to specify more concrete conceptions and
measures for the future. In doing so they should
keep in mind that the Alliance can only be part of
the energy security mosaic. Only if the member 
states’ policies, as well as those of other interna-
tional organizations, are considered will NATO find
a way to add a unique and substantial surplus.
Among the EU’s three complementary targets, ener-
gy security still seems to be undervalued in compari-
son to competitiveness and sustainability, at least
when it comes to political action. The 2nd Strategic
Energy Review, with its concrete infrastructure pro-
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“As a multidimensional concept ener-
gy security contains domestic affairs
and economic aspects but also geo-
politics and a security dimension.”
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posals and the emphasis on solidarity, plus a com-
mon approach towards third countries in addition to
closer cooperation with NATO, may once be seen as
the genesis of full-fledged European energy policy.
Cooperation may thus be the answer to the still ex-
isting imbalance of strategic objectives.
What’s next: A Joint Energy Security Agenda
EU and NATO have somewhat different approaches
to energy security but there is still potential for col-
laboration. The often-cited division of labour, where
the Union reduces energy to a solely political and
economic context while the Alliance or the U.S.,
respectively, is more into se-
curity and military aspects, is
rather obsolete. Today the pos-
sibility to add value to energy
security on both sides of the
Atlantic lies in cooperative or complementary
measures. So next on the agenda there are several
options for an initial BerlinPlus for energy agree-
ment that the senior staff of both organizations in
Brussels should think about:
– Joint Risk Assessment: Due to mostly overlapping
memberships the risks of energy insecurity are of
common concern. Thus, pooling resources for
intelligence and monitoring action would pro-
vide for early warning units of greater scope and
more reliability. Especially (geo-) politically moti-
vated supply interruptions most of the time do
not occur unforeseen, and hence early action may
moderate the negative consequences. As an
immature risk community, EU and NATO mem-
bers as well could raise the level of energy secu-
rity if they engage in patterns of common risk
perception and the formulation of joint counter-
measures.
– Diplomatic Effort Sharing: NATO and EU both
maintain a network of various diplomatic rela-
tions with third countries. So energy issues and
especially energy security should not only be a
topic at meetings with these partners. More than
that, institutionalized forms of cooperation, such
as the Istanbul Initiative, the Russia Councils, or
the Black Sea Synergy program should be used
more effectively to promote transparency, stabil-
ity, and security in energy relations.
– Common Stockpiling: After the first oil crisis the
International Energy Agency was established,
among other things, to install and assure the effi-
cient management of strategic oil stocks, not
without success. While natural gas has in the
meantime become more important as a source of
energy, there are, due to mostly technical rea-
sons, no obligatory gas stocks. As a precept of
solidarity among member states, which guides
both organizations, national gas stocks with
access by all needy partners would contribute to
the energy security of EU and NATO as a whole.
Together with the IEA, NATO and EU might pos-
sibly define a body of senior experts who is in
charge of stock management.
– Crisis Reaction Capacities: Besides strategic stor-
age, last year’s oil price rally and the latest gas
dispute made it obvious that Europe still lacks
capable capacities to tackle such a crisis. As
domestic resources in Europe
and North America are de-
clining, these regions will be
increasingly dependent on du-
rable external supplies. For the
not-so-unlikely case of more frequent energy
cut-offs in the future, the transatlantic partners
could develop a joint panoply of instruments for
emergency response, including forces for the
reconstruction of pipelines, conflict settlement,
or crisis logistics.
This list does not claim to be complete and will be
subject to change in the process of discussion, but at
the end of the day there is no alternative other than
working together on the pressing issue of supply
security. NATO turns 60 this year and has been
searching for new duties since the end of the Cold
War. The EU on the other hand has an mature inter-
nal energy discussion and developed several just
instruments for the economic and ecological aspects
of energy, but still lacks the political capacities and
security means to establish a sound and compre-
hensive energy strategy. BerlinPlus for energy could
lay down the basis for a common approach on ener-
gy security, sometimes complementary, sometimes
collectively in nature. In military affairs BerlinPlus
has been a success for more than ten years now.
Within the next decade a common approach in the
field of energy security will be one as well. The EU
heads of state and government have missed an
opportunity to show unity and fortitude during the
March Council, when they diluted the Nabucco proj-
ect. The NATO anniversary summit in April, a poli-
tical non-event, too passed the chance to initiate a
process of becoming capable in the field of energy. It
seems to me we need another crisis in order to go
for a common, transatlantic approach on energy
security 
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tion to energy security is limited but
still significant.”
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